For an example, consider two alternative belief systems A and B composed of beliefs A1, A2 and B1, B2 respectively. There are two beliefs in each system, neither of which can be justified on its own. If A1 → A2 and A2 → A1, then there are 2 inferential connections in A and a high inferential density. Hello says that makes A probable. However, if only B1 → B2 and not vice versa, then there is only one non-mutual inferential connection in B and therefore a low inferential density. Hello suggests that the lack of mutual justification makes B's entire system unjustified since B1 must act in a fundamental way. From this example we can see that the coherence of a system is defined as being inversely related to the number of beliefs in the system and proportional to the number of relationships within the system. Formally, Bonjour defines consistency by dividing it into five “consistency criteria” such as:1. A belief system is only coherent if it is logically consistent.2. A belief system is coherent in proportion to its degree of probabilistic coherence.3. The coherence of a belief system is increased by the presence of inferential links between the beliefs that compose it and increases in proportion to the number and strength of these links.4. The coherence of a belief system diminishes to the extent that it is divided into subbelief systems relatively disconnected from each other by inferential connections.5. The coherence of a belief system decreases in proportion to the presence of unexplained anomalies in the content of the system's beliefs. Although some facets of this definition may be vague, it is still more precise than McGrew's explanation. In theory, suggests Hello, this non-founder ...... middle of paper ......rks. It should be noted that fictional stories can be logically coherent and can even include large universes of beliefs that can be coherent to an extreme degree. For example, take JRR Tolkien's The Lord of the Rings series, a complete canon with coherent narratives about history, language, culture, characters, and universal properties. We might want to say that an account that Frodo Baggins took the One Ring to Mount Doom is purely false, even though belief in such an account might be considered dense with inferences. Unfortunately, if we want to avoid this problem, we need to understand why this narrative doesn't match the outside world. A coherent non-fundamental account of justification would suggest that believing in this fictional explanation might be justified, even though it clearly is not. This problem poses a real concern when analyzing religious practices.