IntroductionIn this essay, I will seek to describe what is now called the Humean Theory of Reasons (HTR). I will then discuss the moral implications of HTR, around its incompatibility with the notions of moral absolutism and universalism. A possible Korsgaardian response to Hume will then be proposed, suggesting that it may in some cases be irrational to act immorally, but only if our actions are not compatible with the desired goal. I will conclude that the question of whether it is irrational to act immorally raises a number of questions if one is to accept the HTR or Korsgaardian position. Nonetheless, I argue that each of these is more compelling in its response than an externalist alternative because of its potential ability to explain why one acts in a certain way. Hume's Theory of Reasons Hume's theory of reasons falls into the category of reasons internalism, which states that motivational reasons, which explain why an agent performed a particular act, and normative reasons, which operate for or against that act, are inextricably linked. If an agent has a normative reason for acting, this can tell us about their psychology. In other words, if an agent has a reason to act, he also has a motivation to do so. This contrasts with reasons externalism, which asserts that a normative reason exists independently of the agent. Hume refers to the belief-desire pair to suggest that the motivation to perform an action arises only in the presence of both the desire to achieve a particular end and the conviction that acting in a certain way will achieve that end. END. . For example, if an agent is angry with a former lover and wants to make him feel pain, while in addition... middle of paper ...... inference to be made between what is rational and what is correct within society. In other words, rational actions can be considered logical, but nevertheless judged to be wrong. Works CitedFoot, Philippa (1975) “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives” reprinted in Virtues and Vices, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 305. -316.Hume, David (1888) “A Treatise on Human Nature”, LA Selby-Bigge, ed., London: Oxford, 1888. Korsgaard Christine M. (1986) “Scepticism about Practical Reason”, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 83, No. 1 (January 1986), published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc, pp. 5-25. Schroeder, Mark (2007) “The Humean Theory of Reasons”, Oxford Studies in Metaethics 2, Oxford, pp 195-219. Williams, Bernard (1981) “Internal and External Reasons”, Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp... 101-113.