INTRODUCTIONIn his book, Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework, author David Estlund proposes a method of democratic decision-making that he calls “ epistemic proceduralism. In preparing to write this review, I have attempted to gain at least a brief but clear understanding of Estlund's entire framework. Although for reasons of time and space I have not been able to delve into all the available material, I have been pleased to discover that much of this book, including the chapter to which I will refer primarily in this article, is very thorough and well thought out by Estlund. The main premise of his argument is: democratic decisions must use intellectual and epistemic methods to reach a conclusion in order to be considered legitimate. Through the very process of using epistemic methods, the decisions made are more likely to be the right ones for the current situation. In the following pages, I will attempt to explain Estlund's thesis and his position in favor of epistemic proceduralism. I will discuss the main ideas of his argument. I will then present a detailed critique of Estlund's rational, and finally, I will offer a counterargument that I believe will replace the flaws in Estlund's theory. ESTLUND'S ARGUMENT To begin, let's break down Estlund's phrase into its literal sense. “Epistemics,” as we now know, is the study of knowledge itself. As for “proceduralism,” we can intuitively discern that it is the process of moving toward something. Ergo, in its most fundamental sense, epistemic proceduralism is about using knowledge to effectively employ a democratic method of decision-making. In order to be a useful and legitimate democratic method, the results of any procedure must inherently be “better than chance.” This is... middle of document... proceed fairly and no methodology would be necessary. However, as we all know, this world is far from perfect, and democracy in its current state is far from perfect. Although Estlund makes a compelling argument for the practice of epistemic proceduralism, I nevertheless hope to have shown that it is not a foolproof plan for fair justice. Instead, I believe that an adapted form of "correctness" theory should be followed and that we should strive to arrive at the best possible answer to any question. On paper, the process of getting from A to B can be laid out, reasoned, explained and justified. In real life, however, I say that it doesn't matter how we get from A to B, as long as B is the right place in the end. Works Cited Estlund, David M. Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton UP, 2008. Print.