Tufte (1978) and Hibbs (1987) both argue that there are two main political influences on macroeconomic policy: partisanship and electoral incentives. However, they differ in the emphasis they place on each influence. While Tufte emphasizes the influence of electoral incentives, Hibbs argues for the influence of partisanship. Franzese's (2002) study of electoral and partisan influences on macroeconomic outcomes suggests that there is more empirical evidence to support Hibbs' claim. However, he also suggests that there is considerable scope for an analysis of “context-conditioned electoral and partisan cycles” (Franzese, 2002, p. 369). With this in mind, I argue that sitting politicians may alternate between partisanship and electoral incentives when faced with specific national conditions. In particular, I argue that incumbent leaders will rationally choose to pursue electorally oriented economic policy rather than partisan politics under conditions of party weakness. Specifically, assuming that incumbents seek re-election as Tufte and Hibbs suggest, they seek to use their status to influence the outcome of the election. Tufte argues that politicians will do this using "campaignment" methods, while Hibbs finds evidence that incumbents follow policies that are consistent with their party's core beliefs. In a situation in which an incumbent president believes that the core of his party is too weak or fragmented to enable re-election, I argue that the incumbent president will abandon partisan politics in favor of a Tuftian election campaign. Furthermore, I view, in the American context, the midterm elections as a signal that an incumbent president might take into account when pursuing partisan or electoral policies. I'll first talk ... middle of paper ... monetary policy instruments capable of targeting specific groups of marginal voters. Poor performance by the incumbent president's party in midterm elections may be a sign that the incumbent party's constituency is dissatisfied or too weak to provide sufficient support for his re-election. This claim could be evaluated empirically by first looking for cases in which incumbents changed strategies by examining evidence of inflation and policies characteristic of electorally oriented politics. Works Cited Franzese, RJ, Jr. (2002). Electoral and partisan cycles in economic policies and outcomes. Annual Review of Political Science, 5, 369-421. Hibbs, D.A., Jr. (1987). American political economy: macroeconomics and electoral politics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Tufte, E.R. (1978). Political control of the economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.