Explain how Smart argues that brain processes are the same as mental sensations versus what he says about the neutral language of sensations . identity theorist position and believes that mental sensations are identical to a corresponding brain process. Much of Smart's article constitutes a counterargument against identity theorists' greatest rival, the dualists. Science has explained most of the human body in terms of biology, chemistry and physics; even if the brain remains largely mysterious. Recent technological advances in brain research have allowed us to understand the mind much better. This is why Smart believes “that science increasingly gives us a view according to which organisms can be viewed as physicochemical mechanisms” (61). He introduces the concept of Ockham's razor and believes that scientists use it to introduce simplicity into their theories, which simplifies their explanations of concepts. This simplicity is preferred because it also adds a touch of beauty to the discovered laws. Regarding his lightning example, Smart highlights how our experience of lightning is the physical process of electrons being discharged during the ionization of water vapor in the atmosphere. It is important to note here that the two cannot be separated; you will not have a flash of lightning then an electric shock, but rather a flash of lightning that is an electric shock. This metaphor is the essay's crucial argument that sensations are the same as brain processes. Ockham's Razor eliminates unnecessary nomological problems from scientific theories, so why not apply the same concept to a theory of mind? We will not describe in our theory of lightning the terms "flashiness" or "jagged...... middle of paper ......tral, although we do not necessarily always choose neutral terms for ourselves . For example, you may have said, "That sounds like a ton of bricks," but you've never encountered a ton of falling bricks in your life. Only when one has to relate one's experiences to others should one express it in neutral terms, so that others can get the idea that this experience is similar to what they may experience mentally. However, we still cannot deny that sensations or mental states can be brain processes. We can only suggest that subject-neutral terms are simply useful for reporting to others, and are not always necessarily true. Perhaps this is why Smart thought the dualist objection posed his greatest threat. Works Cited Chalmers, David John, comp. Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. New York: Oxford UP, 2002. Print.