Taken at face value, federalism appears to be inherently detrimental to the legislative powers of the central government. Sacrificing a certain degree of authority for the benefit of a subnational unit can (but not always) lead to a central government which, simply put, does not always get what it wants. This revelation then begs the question: why would constitutional designers even care about federalism? Especially since often, the shapers will also be part of the government. The answer is not always simple, but in short, federalism is essential to democracy. That is, to impose limits on the authority of the central government in order to prevent tyranny. If this limitation results from the investment of a certain degree of authority in distinct subnational units, the main problem we then face is how powerful should these states be? Does it matter whether the constitution defines their powers or not? I argue that the specification of powers is indeed important because at the heart of federalism, the primary determinant of behavior is to whom subnational governments are accountable. Federalism can be analyzed into two categories: administrative units and federal units. In the administrative sense, subnational units are constructed solely for organizational and implementation purposes. In this model, the central government is completely powerful and subnational governments simply execute decisions made at the national level. This type of federalism has a great advantage: the legislative process takes place relatively more easily (in reference to federal units). The reason being that there are simply fewer obstacles to overcome. When the central government makes a decision, it is passed down to the subnational level...... middle of paper ......re becomes a mutual recognition between the state and federal levels as to their respective roles in the government process as a whole. A constitution that defines powers also helps create stability and institutional barriers against the tyranny of the central government. Overall, it seems clear that putting the rules in writing is indeed important. Works Cited Carey, John M. “Parchment, Equilibria, and Institutions.” » Comparative Political Studies. 33(6-7): 735-761. Printed. Sept. 2000 “Constitutional amendments”. National Constitution Center – Constitutioncenter.org, nd Web, March 16, 2014. Devas, Nick and Simon Delay. “Local democracy and the challenges of state decentralization: an international perspective. » Studies on local government. 32 (5): 677-695. 2006 Heller, William B. “Class Notes.” Binghamton University, SUNYNotes February 6 2014