Roe v. Wade in 1973 precipitated a divisive conflict over abortion rights in America, moving from a state question to a national question. Roe constitutionalized the choice of abortion under the right to privacy in the Fourteenth Amendment, only allowing state interference in the third trimester of pregnancy. Theoretical studies have linked public opinion to policymaking, highlighting how its impact depends on the salience of the issue among citizens and the involvement of interest groups. Despite its apparent consistency since 1973, public opinion on abortion is incredibly complex, with disagreements over the circumstances that justify an abortion as well as methodological problems regarding the wording and ordering of questions in surveys. Daniel Williams and Barbara Craig argue that public opinion has played an indirect role on the Supreme Court and politicians. Others, such as Linda Greenhouse, have argued that Roe was significantly influenced by growing political movements in the 1960s, while Donald Critchlow suggests that the rise of the pro-life movement influenced the passage of anti-abortion laws. Meanwhile, Howard Ball and David Garrow have emphasized the importance of Supreme Court justices, particularly their values ​​and ideological leanings, in shaping abortion policy. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on “Why Violent Video Games Should Not Be Banned”? Get the original essay Ultimately, the general public had an insignificant impact on abortion policy, with small groups of activists proving central to policy developments. Presidents were visibly attentive to public opinion in the 1970s, but polarization affected politicians and activists earlier than the general public, increasing the involvement of interest groups in policymaking. Congress adopted minimal abortion policy, initially due to electoral considerations by its members to avoid making decisions on abortion, while legislative success remained uncertain through the 1980s, as divisions in Congress coalesced with the breakup of the pro-life movement. Finally, Supreme Court cases have generally been influenced to some extent by activist groups, although the underlying issue of justices' values ​​has become more prominent since 1989, illustrating how judicial philosophies have significantly shaped court politics. abortion within the Court. This essay will be structured around the three branches of the federal government, assessing the influence of public opinion on abortion policy from 1965 to 1992 as well as how these institutions were distributed and affected the development of policies of each other. Several Supreme Court rulings before Roe emerged as a result of a litigation strategy designed by pro-choice activists rather than the broader public. Patricia Windle argues that change was inevitable in the late 1960s, as a broad movement emerged for the expansion of personal rights. Liberating advances, such as the pill, motivated women to exercise greater independence and to campaign for the right to abortion. However, Windle's argument overlooks the fact that only 40 percent of respondents supported a pro-choice position in 1969, most limiting abortion to cases where the mother was ill or had been raped. In fact, abortion still remaineda minor issue, with policy driven by a core group of activists, largely made up of medical professionals, who used federal litigation to initiate change. These activists used the right to privacy, established in Griswold v. Connecticut in 1965, to attack anti-abortion laws in California and Colombia in People v. Belous in 1969 and United States v. Vuitch in 1971 respectively. Garrow highlights how both cases were an endorsement of litigation strategy, including large numbers of female plaintiffs and amicus briefs signed by doctors and lawyers. These successes spurred other projects, as evidenced by the assistance of attorneys Roy Lucas and Richard Samuel in appealing an abortion conviction of Dr. Sherwin Raymond, sensing an opportunity to repeal anti-abortion laws in New York. Jersey. Progress would have been improbable without the fact that most of the lawyers were middle class and pro-choice, or without the tolerant Warren Court, ruling in a liberal direction in 76 percent of cases during the 1960s. he initiative and strategy of pro-choice activists has shaped the nature of these cases, acting as a driving force behind the decisions. Roe was therefore not a Supreme Court response to pro-choice public opinion, but rather the culmination of activists. litigation strategy. Russell Hittinger points out that 60% of states still banned abortion in 1973. Furthermore, the reform measures introduced generally lacked de facto implementation, as evidenced by the fact that only 25 legal abortions took place each month in Colorado and North Carolina, implying a lack of public approval for the measure. new laws. Although Gallup polls from 1969 to 1972 show an increase in pro-choice support from 40% to 46%, this level is still low when considering the magnitude of the change initiated by Roe. Additionally, a detailed National Opinion Research Center survey reveals considerable disagreement over approved circumstances for abortion, obscured by broader polling, with more than 50 percent opposing abortion for reasons relational or family. Instead, the decision-making in Roe further illustrates the impact of litigation strategy as well as the broader pro-choice movement. Robert McKeever highlights how Roe, and the accompanying Doe vs. Bolton case, were class actions, organized and financed by pro-choice interest groups, which were becoming more influential outside the courtroom by 1973 Indeed, Greenhouse identifies how the movement incorporated women calling for abortion on demand, reflecting the broader emergence of abortion as a national issue. Radical individuals, such as Patricia Maginnis, and groups, particularly NARAL, have organized petitions and training sessions, while defending abortion rights in demonstrations to attract national media attention and support. The publicity and intensity of the movement likely gave the impression of widespread support, which is significant in light of Justice Rehnquist's 1986 admission that "[since the justices] watch television, read the newspapers, talk to their families, it would be remarkable if they were 'unaffected by the tides of public opinion.' Given that the Burger Court has only twice issued more than 50 percent of its annual decisions in a liberal direction, the justices' sweeping decision to allow abortion on demand under certain regulations creates the impression of external influence on the Court. John Ely seems overzealous in claiming judges actedaccording to their own beliefs in Roe. Nonetheless, the decision certainly illustrates the incorporation of the views of the pro-choice movement rather than the general public, adhering to Greenhouse's assertion that the justices viewed abortion through the eyes of medical elites and feminist activists . The decisions of the Supreme Court therefore seem to be influenced to a certain extent. by activist movements, although Webster v. Reproductive Health Services in 1989 refutes this trend. Before Webster, right-to-choice advocates filed 49 briefs, wrote about 40,000 letters a day, and organized a 300,000-person march on Washington in April 1989, seeking to capture media attention and influence judges. However, Webster rejected the choice of abortion as a fundamental right to privacy, allowing the state to have discretion over the funding and availability of abortion. Karen O'Connor suggests that the decision was the result of the conservative composition of the bench, after O'Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia and Kennedy were appointed by Reagan. Yet O'Connor's interpretation is overly simplistic when analyzing the opinion, revealing how Sandra O'Connor opposed overturning Roe, saying it would violate "the fundamental rule judicial restraint”. In explaining his actions, Maltz highlights O'Connor's centrist approach, oscillating between the Court's conservative and liberal blocs on different cases. However, his action stems above all from his judicial philosophy; During his confirmation hearings, O'Connor openly stated his preference for federal judicial restraint, believing that the Court should enforce laws rather than make policy. Additionally, although her study is limited to the first three years of O'Connor's tenure, Barbara Bruckman highlights the trend toward judicial restraint in O'Connor's decisions, limiting the Court's power and protecting the interests of the state. When we consider that O'Connor's nomination was primarily motivated by her gender, the importance of the justices becomes even more evident. Indeed, such reasoning juxtaposes limitations on presidential influence on the Court by the general public with the Court's broader jurisdiction to block executive policy if deemed necessary. As a result, the Court significantly influences the policy and decision-making of the other branches, determined to a large extent by the philosophies of the sitting justices. The decision in Planned Parenthood vs. Casey in 1992 to uphold the “central position” of Roe further illustrates the importance of Supreme Court justices in determining decisions. Despite widespread hope that the case would overturn Roe, the majority opinion reaffirmed the choice of abortion, although restrictions were put in place, provided they did not impose an "undue burden" on women. women seeking abortion. A reversal was expected, since eight justices had been appointed by Republican presidents and the only one appointed by a Democrat, Byron White, had dissented in Roe. Still, Casey saw O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter joining Blackmun and Stevens in a majority. The opinion justifies its decision differently from previous rulings, asserting that “the Court must make decisions…based on principles, not as compromises with social and political pressures.” The decision is therefore an example of stare decisis, binding the justices to Roe precedent. The decision emphasizes that Roe's reasoning has not changed, ignoring the pro-life opposition that encouraged its overturning. This decision is related to the changing dynamics of the Court after the nominations of Kennedy and Souter. Expectedconservatives upon their confirmation, Fliter and Tomlins point out how both proved to be more liberal, handling cases on an individual basis. Once again, these appointments reveal the president's limited influence on abortion policy, forced to appoint more moderate justices to appease activists and the Senate, thereby making the Court more unpredictable in its decisions. Ultimately, Webster and Casey establish that judges are crucial determinants of abortion policy, influenced to a lesser extent by the executive, which lacks freedom in appointing judges and acts through indirect means to seek policy changes through the Court. Ronald Weber's simulation methodology reveals a positive relationship between abortion liberalization and pro-choice public opinion before Roe. States like California, Colorado and Hawaii have liberalized their abortion laws, unlike Minnesota and Michigan which have not introduced similar legislation. It is reasonable to argue that the general public partially influenced policymaking, since these decisions were made before the 1970 election, suggesting that legislators acted in a manner deemed popular. The Hawaii case study appears to support this argument, as both parties have taken strongly liberal positions, competing for the 53 percent of people in favor of pro-choice abortion laws. Yet the passage of the legislation was influenced to a greater extent by Hawaii's unions. Steinhoff highlights how these groups used their size and political power in elections to persuade lawmakers to pass the bill. Additionally, in Colorado in 1967, Lader described the passage of the liberalization bill as the product of an "internal" strategy, in that several political leaders worked within the party's legislature to put pressure on state legislators. Such evidence thus posits that the general public has indirect influence on legislators, but that their general apathy toward abortion means that most changes are driven by activist groups. The New York legislation further highlights the importance of activism in influencing abortion policy. The Cook bill narrowly passed in 1970, allowing abortion up to the 24th week of pregnancy. Weber's research suggests that 52 percent favored a liberalized law, but this success was unexpected because of the strength of the New York Catholic Church, which mobilized against a similar bill in 1967. Williams points out that most legislators thus opposed liberalization, aware of the importance of abortion among Catholics and that allowing the choice of abortion would destroy their political careers. The explanation behind this change in legislators' attitudes is revealed by George Michaels' reasoning for voting yes to "have some peace" in his family. Thus, it appears that the vote was influenced not by organized interest groups, but by "the wives of the Senate and Assembly," as Governor Rockefeller noted. Such evidence highlights the individual activism of these women, reaffirming the importance of opinion intensity in bringing about change. At the same time, Williams illustrates how the passage of the bill reflects the impact of non-activism, identifying the complacent approach of the Catholic Church, which took no action, believing the legislation would not pass. This case study thus reaffirms the importance of public activism in determining abortion policy,necessary to both initiate and block legislation. The only major abortion-related legislation passed by Congress was the Hyde Amendment in 1976, correlating with public opinion on abortion funding. but ultimately provoked by the pro-life movement's lobbying of its members. Pro-life activists aimed to limit the impact of Roe by banning funding for Medicaid, which had permitted 270,000 abortions in 1973. In this sense, public opinion was essential in the pro-life strategy, as many lawmakers were wary of potential opposition if Roe was overturned. . The pro-life movement thus targeted the ban on abortion funding, supported by 55% of people in 1976 and seen as an effective way to limit the impact of Roe, while attracting support from Congress. Despite this, activists played a central role in ensuring the bill passed. After the defeat of the Roncallo Amendment in 1974, Craig highlights how activists used voting results to pressure members for future success, exemplified by consistent votes banning abortion funding from 1976 to 1989 Evidence of this activity is included in Robert Giamo's reflection that "I know the big lobby and the pressure put on members", illustrated in particular by the work of Mark Gallagher. A lobbyist for the NCHLA Gallagher was present at the committee stage of the amendment, reportedly "indicating to the 11 House speakers whether the proposal is acceptable to the bishops with each compromise offer." Significantly, eight of these speakers were Catholic, influenced by the strong involvement and substantial funding provided by the Church to the pro-life movement. Therefore, not only was the pro-life movement very active in legislative proceedings, but the resources and intensity devoted to these activities ensured they had influence, limiting access to abortion through the Hyde Amendment . The failure of anti-abortion legislation in Congress resulted primarily from growing divisions within the pro-life movement, resulting from disagreements over the wording and emphasis of the amendments. Garrow uses the example of a series of constitutional amendments proposed in March 1974. The amendments were generally rejected, reflecting the difficulties of amending the constitution and thus changing Supreme Court decisions, but the episode also highlights the serious disunity within the pro-life movement. . Garrow highlights how many pro-life advocates have refuted these efforts, simply defending embryo-inclusive legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment. Their anger at more moderate proposals contributed to the splintering of interest groups, weakening any attempt to introduce change. Indeed, NCHLA leader Robert Lynch explained that "there are six pro-life organizations, each with a different amendment and plan, each refusing to work with one another." Durham illustrates how these problems were further exacerbated in the 1980s by the emergence of more violent groups, notably Operation Rescue, who further divided the movement through their destructive tactics. Clearly, interest group division undermined legislative policy efforts, but some activists continued to pursue this strategy, but they were constrained by the presidential veto. For example, Bush vetoed approval bills in 1990 that sought to restore funding for poor women in Colombia who became pregnant as a result of rape or incest. Accordingly, Congress's interaction with other branches must also be responsible for the failure of theanti-abortion legislation, struggling to overcome Supreme Court rulings and encountering executive resistance when majorities are found. The lack of abortion policy within Congress also stems from electoral considerations by its members, seeking to appease larger activist groups within the states. Throughout the 1970s, members of Congress often referred abortion policy to the Supreme Court, fearing that any decision would anger activists and lead to their dismissal. Wilson describes how Senator Clark's defeat in Iowa in 1978 was engineered by anti-abortion forces, who destroyed his majority in Catholic neighborhoods through campaigning and leafleting. Given that only 1-2% of the population considers abortion an important issue, politicians' deference and alignment with activist groups reaffirms that abortion policymaking reflects the views of activists rather than those of the general public. Indeed, the growing importance of abortion in the 1980s was reversed by polarization within political circles and activist groups, diverting influence away from more complex public opinion. Polarization has produced different impacts on members of Congress, depending on the prevailing opinion within their state. For example, in two gubernatorial elections in Virginia and New Jersey in 1989, pro-choice Democrats Wilder and Florio gained significant advantage from their positions. Yet Bob Packwood and Bob Casey, senators who contradicted their party's lines on abortion, remained consistently elected. What is clear from these examples is that attitudes toward abortion took precedence over party affiliation when voting for candidates. Furthermore, it is clear that members' attitudes rarely change on this issue. Indeed, Adams' study uses congressional roll calls to show that most lawmakers voted consistently in favor of abortion 90 percent of the time. As a result, the shift in attitudes toward abortion in Congress occurs not through a shift in views, but through a shift in membership, as activists compete to protect their supporters and impeach their opponents . The politics of abortion infused itself into presidential politics after Roe, but Ford and Carter straddled the abortion debate to maximize support from a divided and indifferent general public. Ford defended states' rights to abortion in the 1976 election, but this position was vague and seemed contradictory, since he had previously vetoed the Hyde Amendment while president, defending himself on the “fiscal integrity issue”. Carter was equally vague in a seminal statement opposing abortion, illustrating how both parties had hoped to avoid the issue of abortion until the single-issue anti-abortion campaign Ellen McCormack makes it necessary to take a position. Carter and Ford responded to the activism, likely adopting an anti-abortion stance to appease activists and limit the number of wasted votes. As president, Carter took minimal action related to abortion, avoiding debates over the Hyde Amendment and selecting advisers with a mix of attitudes, for example, pro-choice Midge Constanza as top aide and Joseph Califano pro-life as secretary of HEW. Indeed, Craig demonstrates how Carter lacked presidential leadership on abortion, asserting his personal opposition to abortion, but his dutypresident to enforce the law as it existed in 1980. Ultimately, this ambivalence toward abortion reflects the lack of importance of the issue among the general public. . Only 1 percent of respondents placed abortion among their top three issues in the election, while less than half were informed about Roe in 1975. Abortion politics were not yet polarized, leaving presidents more focused on appealing to the general public, while doing the minimum to appease activists, thereby precipitating a preference for rhetoric over policy on the part of Ford and Carter. Reagan was the first president to take a definitive stance on abortion, but it appears that this approach emanated at least in part from pro-life supporters within society. Garrow questions Reagan's anti-abortion stance, referencing his earlier support of the Beilenson bill in 1967 while governor of California, allowing "therapeutic" abortions for women. However, Garrow overlooks how Reagan immediately expressed regret over the bill's passage, declaring that the debate over life or death "should be resolved in favor of life." Despite this, Reagan's anti-abortion stance in the 1980 election was at least partly the result of political calculation; O'Connor demonstrates how both parties were becoming increasingly distinctive in favor of abortion, as evidenced by the pro-life commitment within the Republican Party. The rise of the religious right, particularly through the Moral Majority, has mobilized broad support and devoted considerable resources to Republicans, essentially forcing candidates to adopt a pro-life stance. Furthermore, the issue had become more important from 1980 onwards; 17% of respondents ranked abortion among their three most important issues, pointing to the growth of activist movements within society and the fact that Ford and Carter's compromise rhetoric would be ineffective. In this sense, political and activist circles were increasingly polarized in their view of abortion, shifting influence over political candidates from the general public to the activist public. Although he did not achieve his ambitious goals, Reagan's limited abortion policy stemmed more from the limits placed on abortion policy. its power imposed by Congress and the activist public than a non-committal anti-abortion position. Graber claimed that Reagan only made statements on abortion, criticizing failure to adhere to his anti-abortion agenda. However, Sundquist notes how legislative attempts to introduce an abortion policy suffered from conflicts over New Right social and moral measures that divided the Republican Party. Republicans, such as Olympia Snowe and Claudine Schneider, opposed Reagan's conservative social agenda, so much so that Schneider opposed the president's position 75 percent of the time. Considering the fact that more than 80 percent of Democrats voted in favor of choice, it is not surprising that legislative attempts to overturn abortion laws have failed. Instead, Reagan sought change through the Supreme Court, seeking to fill the federal bench with judges who "believed in law and order and a strict interpretation of the Constitution." Reagan used the selection process as an "ideological litmus test" to choose justices who were social conservatives, committed to overturning Roe. Graber's criticism of Reagan's disappointing appointments to the Court, however, mustbe refuted, as his decisions were largely influenced by activist groups and the Senate. In the case of the nomination of Ronald Bork, an anti-abortion radical, 52 percent of those surveyed disagreed with the nomination, but Garrow points to the predominant influence of activist protests during his tenure.confirmation hearings, combined to the work that senators have devoted to analyzing his file and his philosophy. Additionally, the Senate was strongly pro-choice at that time, making the nomination's failure understandable; had it succeeded, Roe would almost certainly have been overturned. Such evidence therefore reiterates the influence of Congress on the president in determining abortion policy, limiting his legislative and judicial agenda, alongside the constant mobilization of activist groups to oppose the actions with which they were disagree. Meanwhile, George Bush's abortion policies were significantly dictated by supporters in Congress. -life movement and conservative voters within society. In the 1988 election, Bush renounced his earlier moderate views and adopted an anti-abortion stance because Republican candidates needed to be acceptable to the pro-life movement. In a 1987 Conservative Digest poll, only 9 percent of respondents chose Bush as their preferred Republican candidate. Aware of this lack of support, Bush aligned himself with pro-life forces, making Dan Quayle his running mate, a young conservative with strong anti-abortion views. Bush's alignment with pro-life forces guaranteed votes in the election, as the 30 percent of voters who ranked abortion among the top three issues overwhelmingly voted for Bush, suggesting that the Pro-life activists were more intense and more influential in determining policy than pro-choice groups. . Similar to Reagan's, Bush's agenda was more limited in its application during his presidency, suffering from the same problems when nominating judges. Rosen points out that David Souter's nomination was primarily based on the lack of a paper trail, using Souter's vague and moderate beliefs to gain approval from the pro-choice Senate. Likewise, with a Democratic-dominated House, policy developments were ultimately limited, as abortion legislation was either rejected by its members or vetoed by Bush. As a result, Bush's limited policy accomplishments were partly due to his uncommitted pro-life stance, but also the result of interaction with other branches of government. Keep in mind: this is just a sample. Get a personalized article from our expert writers now. To conclude, general public opinion ultimately had a minor effect on abortion policy from 1965 to 1992, influenced to a greater extent by activist groups. Although it initially influenced presidents, polarization within political and activist groups defined parties around a particular position. Greater involvement by activist groups put pressure on policymaking, but this was ultimately constrained by checks on presidential power by Congress and the pro-choice opposition. Similarly, Congress introduced minimal abortion policy, initially for electoral reasons, but more recently due to greater polarization among members and divisions within the pro-life movement. The Supreme Court has shown itself vulnerable to the actions of activist groups, but it is evident, more explicitly since.