Although Algeria experienced some uprisings in early 2011, the scale and results of these uprisings were not like those in Libya, of Tunisia and Egypt. The fact that the regime did not change in Algeria during the Arab Spring of 2011 led many to believe that the Algerian civil war of 1992–2002 acted as a boost to the Algerian state and immunized Algeria against the Arab Spring. But Algeria experienced its spring more than two decades before the Arab Spring of 2011. Bruce Riedelargues that even in 2011, the Algerian spring preceded the Tunisian uprising. It is true that widespread and publicized demonstrations broke out across Algeria in the first half of January 2011, but they are a continuation of the protests that began at the end of 2010. These protests, however, calmed down at the same time. speed that they broke out due to various demonstrations. reasons which will be discussed shortly. There is no doubt that the ten-year civil war, as well as the price that ordinary Algerians paid for it (being killed either by the Islamists or the army), led many Algerians to understand that 'another uprising could bring back more of the same. But such an argument alone is not enough to explain why and how the Algerian regime has managed to counter and contain the revolutionary fervor from the beginning of 2011 until today. Several issues such as the role of the international community, oil and the regime's experience with Islamist parties in the past, as well as multi-partyism, have played a crucial role in allowing the regime to retain its power. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on “Why violent video games should not be banned”? Get the original essay The Algerian “Arab Spring” occurred on October 4, 1988 in the suburbs of Algiers, the capital. Around 20,000 ordinary Algerians took to the streets to protest the dire socio-economic conditions. In response to the week-long protests, President Chadli Bendjadid promised to end one-party rule and amend the constitution by referendum to open political space for a multi-party system. Along with other parties, the FIS (Islamic Salvation Front) emerged in 1989 and subsequently dominated the political scene. Because the main cause of the uprising was a bad economy, the FIS made economic reforms its main goal. Before the uprisings, the Algerian government used regulations to exclude many petty bourgeois from the Algerian economy. The FIS, for its part, called for fewer regulations, to make it easier for small businesses to enter the market, for the removal of quotas and trade barriers, for the promotion of small and medium-sized businesses, for lower taxes and for the end of state monopolies. FIS's promises were attractive to the middle class and the poor because the party claimed its policies would create jobs, end corruption, and improve the economy. More than twenty years later, when Algerians took to the streets in early 2011, they had the same demands. The only difference was that this time there was no FIS, nor any other major independent political party opposing the ruling elite. Quite the contrary, the opposition was very fragmented, which meant that not only was there no leading party to organize the protests; there were opposing views on the uprising and demands. Algeria has a relatively free press and when these riots broke out, the pressPrivate and governmental nationalism has begun to remind Algerians of the Algerian spring of 1988 and that if things change in Algeria, it will not be for the better. Press freedom is often linked to the promotion of democracy and the voice of the people. But in Algeria, he did just the opposite by demanding peace and security rather than democracy in 2011. The role of social media is repeatedly highlighted in the success of Egypt and other South African countries. North, but the Algerian case shows that social media cannot be decisive. determining factor in advancing a revolution. Algerian Internet is also relatively freer than other North African states because there are private Internet service providers in Algeria that connect directly to Europe without any government control. The Internet and social media were accessible in Algeria during the Arab Spring, but as we have seen, the Algerian regime did not change. Therefore, while we cannot ignore the role played by social media in Egypt, it must be clear that social media is not a major factor in system change or the success of a revolution, but rather one of means that can be used for publicity purposes by those in conflict. well trained or accustomed to using it effectively. The importance of Algerian military and police forces was also one of the key elements that helped the regime contain the spring of 2011. The number of security forces and police increased as a direct result of the 1988 riots. civil war, the regime continued to increase its spending on military equipment and police personnel. In 2011, the police and gendarmerie had 200,000 members. The regime managed to send a large number of security forces to support the demonstrators. For example, during some riots in early 2011, particularly in large cities like the capital Algiers, the police outnumbered the demonstrators by a ratio of 10 to 1. The other problem that allowed the police to contain the revolution was the way the security forces handled the revolution. the situation. During the October 1988 riots, security forces killed 500 people in two days. In 2011, however, during week-long protests, only three protesters were killed. The regime knew that the blood of slain protesters could act as a catalyst and would be used as a symbol to call more people into the streets. This is why the regime took great care to avoid massacres and used police force to block access to demonstration sites or used the army to disperse demonstrators by arresting them or directing them to other places. other paths. When the Algerian army canceled the 1991 elections, it also arrested the FIS party leaders and banned the party in 1992. When the army saw that Bendjadid sympathized with the FIS, it organized a coup. state and removed it from power in 1992. Western powers also gave legitimacy to the FIS because it came to power democratically. For example, the Clinton administration, which feared that abandoning the FIS would turn Algeria into another Iran, began preemptive negotiations with the FIS in the early 1990s. When the military noticed that the West sympathized with the FIS, the junta took various measures to provoke violent reactions from the FIS in order to turn Western powers and the Algerian people against the party in the 1990s. For example, Rabih Kebir, spokesperson for the FIS for foreign affairs, demanded a dialogue between the government and the FIS on January 27, 1992. The military arrested him the next day. In 2011,To avoid past mistakes, soon after the uprisings broke out, the regime ended the state of emergency and even encouraged the creation of more political parties. Such a policy was welcomed by some elites, not because they could raise their voices, but rather because it was a way for some elites to enter into a clientelist relationship with the regime and benefit from a part of the oil profits. Furthermore, this led to the fragmentation of the opposition since different parties were created and each of these parties presented its own program. The military's interest in the economy has forced army leaders to be more pragmatic in their handling of protesters and avoid an economic shutdown. . The army controls Sonatrach, Algeria's largest national oil company. Due to fluctuations in the price of oil, Algerians have learned to base their national budget on a reduced oil price. This means that if the price of oil is, for example, 40 dollars per barrel, the Algerian state bases its budget as if the price of oil were 10 dollars per barrel. This had two effects: it allowed the Algerian ruling class to protect itself against US manipulation of oil. On the other hand, it created a massive monetary reserve, useful in times of crisis. The Algerian regime learned this lesson the hard way. Oil revenues were a major source of state revenue (57.9%) and Algeria had an average GDP growth rate of 6.8% until 1986. The US government pushed Saudi Arabia to increase its production, which led to a fall in prices. oil from $40 per barrel to $10 in 1986. These changes led to a decrease in Algerian revenues of 55% (from $47 billion in 1985 to $21 billion in 1986). Faced with a lack of liquidity and reluctant to involve the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the Algerian economy, President Chadli Bendjadid (1979–1992) reduced imports to the point that in no time, most products basic commodities, such as wheat, were rare or very expensive at the end of the 1980s. This drop in national income which increased the price of foodstuffs was one of the main causes of the first Algerian spring in 1988. Based on its national budget on a reduced oil price, the Algerian regime was able in 2011 to use the enormous monetary reserve to lower the price of basic products like flour and sugar and also to increase the salaries of civil servants by 34%. . With large sums of money at its disposal, the government tried to buy off young people and divert them from the streets with cheap loans. For example, after the January 2011 uprisings, the government provided a loan of up to $300,000 to young people who wanted to start a business. Instead of taking to the streets, young people invaded the offices responsible for applying for and processing these loans. Thus, while oil was a curse to the previous regime, it helped save the regime from the wave of revolutionary fervor of 2011. The role of the army in protecting its interests in Algeria is undoubtedly important, but what differentiates it from the Egyptian army system is its penetration into the opposition parties. For example, during the civil war, the Algerian secret services (DRS) created more radical militant Islamic groups such as the GIA (Islamic Armed Group) in order to give the FIS a bad reputation. Even today, the army exercises a certain influence and has elements in the opposition parties. The military's influence over the parties helped the military both divide the opposition and use these elements to control the parties. Furthermore, the Egyptian army hadalso less economic ties with Mubarak than that of Algeria. As Haseeb reminds us of a saying in Arab countries: “If each state has an army, the Algerian army has a state”. The civil war ended in 2002 thanks to President Abdulaziz Bouteflika's reconciliation program. Although Islamist insurgents are still active in Algeria, they no longer pose a major threat. The reconciliation process brought relative stability to the Algerian state throughout the 2000s. Although US-Algerian relations date back to 1795, since 9/11 the US and Algerian governments have signed various agreements aimed at weakening the national and international terrorist cells. Since 2005, for example, Algeria and the United States have signed the Joint Military Dialogue, a process that includes military exchanges and training, and the two countries have held joint military exercises. The United States is also Algeria's largest trading partner for crude oil. Furthermore, Bouteflika launched a second wave of reconciliation by organizing a referendum called the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation. The referendum voted in September 2005 aims to provide amnesty to Islamists who have not committed “murders, rapes or bomb attacks”. The regime also began providing regular stipends to "patriots" for their work during the civil war to buy their support in 2007. Unlike Egypt which banned all opposition parties, the Algerian regime was successful to fragment the opposition and bring the opposition together. under its payroll, some key opposition figures. Some of these Islamic parties such as the Green Algeria Alliance created a coalition government sharing the oil spoils after the 2012 elections. The coming to power of Islamist parties in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, on the one hand , made ordinary Algerians suspicious of Islamist parties while, on the other hand, allowed the regime to strengthen its grip on power. After the Arab Spring, Islamic parties like An-Nahda in Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt came to power. The West supported or sanctioned the Algerian regime's action to suppress what was on the rise in North Africa, Islamic extremism. Some terrorist cells and groups, such as AQIM (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb), operated in Algeria well before the Arab Spring. The support of the United States and European countries for the Algerian army was sufficiently strong even if the army's actions resulted in the loss of lives of American or British nationals. For example, when several American and British nationals were killed by the Algerian army during the January 2013 hostage crisis, William Hague, the British Foreign Secretary, asserted that we (the West) cannot bear of “judgment” on the actions of the Algerian army. . The hostage crisis of early 2013 was sparked by French involvement in protecting the Malian government against Islamist extremists. Although this is a recent issue, we have seen in other parts of the essay that the army actively bought support from the West after 1992. The utilitarian role of the Algerian army in the "war on terror", especially after the West lost Mubarak, a long-time ally in Egypt, meaning that the West came to view Algeria as the only reliable ally with strong prowess military in North Africa. Thus, as the actions of the Algerian army are mostly sanctioned by the international community, the army has a free hand to do whatever it wants in order to protect its interests in the.