Hidden in the depths of international waters, strategic missile submarines (SSBNs) wait to carry out domestic orders to ensure nuclear destruction opposing targets. Until that scary moment comes, SSBNs remain the most survivable strategic deterrent platforms of five (soon to be six) countries. Their role is as much to deter a nuclear attack as to carry out such a launch mission. SSBNs found their place in Russia's strategic triad early in the Cold War, but today their operational readiness (and deterrent role) appears under threat – from their own nation. Building, operating, and maintaining a mission-ready SSBN force is an extremely expensive endeavor. commitment. First, if national leaders rely on nuclear deterrence as the maxim of their national security strategy, they must support it with sound decision-making and enforce effective prioritization of scarce resources. Second, the nation must operate on sound economic principles and diversify its investments for its future. Finally, it is essential to build and maintain a strong technology sector with a talented workforce. Russia does not meet all of these essential criteria. In August 2009, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin recently identified "maintaining and developing nuclear capability" as a military budget priority, but according to defense industry reports, Russian defense budgets are suffering losses. by around 40%. due to corruption every year. This atmosphere is not representative of the stability of Russian leadership in defense matters. The Russian economy is extremely dependent on gas and oil exports. Operating as a monopoly energy supplier in Eurasia does not provide enough diversity to absorb a tough economic recession...... middle of paper ......This next-generation SSBN-SLBM combination is woefully the even for Russian nuclear power. underwater program. Between 2000 and 2008, four Russian nuclear submarine accidents took place (2 sank, 2 caught fire), killing 149 sailors, including the entire crew of the Kursk. Russia has a litany of issues to resolve to restore confidence in the maritime sector. stage of their nuclear deterrence triad with a certain expectation of certainty. In the meantime, the U.S. national command authority and intelligence community must reevaluate our position regarding ongoing strategic weapons negotiations with Russia, ensuring that the current status of their SSBN program is part of our calculus negotiation. Just as important, our leaders must re-evaluate our own SSBN fleet; to include the range of resources and technological advancement that we are committed to enabling our nuclear deterrent capability.